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SAFEGUARDING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE
FACE OF FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATIONS
Tiffany Seeman*
Executives and accountants do not work alone. In fact, in our cor-
porate world today.., executives and accountants work day to day
with lawyers. They give them advice on almost each and every
transaction. That means when executives and accountants have
been engaged in wrongdoing, there have been some other folks at
the scene of the crime - and generally they are lawyers. - Senator
Jon Corzine, D-NJ, during Senate discussion of the 2002 Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the erosion of corporate integrity exemplified by the
collapse of corporate giants such as Enron and WorldCom, Congress
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Act"). 2 The Act required
widespread changes in corporate governance.3 Specifically, Congress
directed the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to require
that an attorney report evidence of a "material violation of securities
law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or
any agent thereof" to the company's chief legal officer ("CLO") or
* J.D., DePaul University, College of Law expected 2006; B.S., University of Kansas 2000.
The author would like to thank Professor Leonard Cavise for his direction in selecting a topic for
this comment and Brad Hurwitz for his thoughtful critique of several drafts.
1. Senate Consideration of Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of
2002,107th Cong. S6524, S6556 (2002) (statement of Sen. Jon Corzine in discussing amendment
4187 modifying attorney practice to clients).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2003); Robert S. Litt, Unsealing the Lawyer's Lips: The Changing
Contours of the Attorney-Client Privilege in an Era of Corporate Fraud, THE A.B.A CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SECTION AND THE CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, WHITE COLLAR
CRIME 2004, at C-1, C-3. On March 15, 2005, CEO of WorldCom, Bernie Ebbers was found
guilty of securities fraud, conspiracy and seven counts of filing false reports with regulators. Ken
Belson, Ex-Chief of WorldCom is Found Guilty in $11 Billion Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005,
at Al. Ebbers is the most prominent executive yet to be convicted in a corporate fraud case. Id.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266. In particular, § 307 of the Act directed the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) to create minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys
practicing before the SEC. See § 7245. Section 307 became § 7245 when the law was codified.
However, § 7245 is still referred to as § 307. Litt, supra note 2, at C-3.
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chief executive officer ("CEO").4 The implementation of SEC Rule
2055 brought attorney conduct, which had traditionally been regulated
by the states, under federal regulation. 6
The new SEC rules have dramatically shifted the landscape in which
corporate lawyers work.7 SEC Rule 205 not only applies to preven-
tion of future conduct but also, in some circumstances, to events that
have occurred in the past and regardless of whether or not the lawyer
learned of this activity through confidential communications.8 Fur-
ther, the SEC has suggested additional regulations requiring the attor-
ney to withdraw from representing the corporation and notify the
SEC of any material violations by the corporation. 9 These rules are
broader than most state professional responsibility rules that require
an attorney to withdraw from the case if the client continues malfea-
sance and to report to officials only when the attorney is confident
that his client may invoke imminent bodily harm on another
individual.10
4. 15 U.S.C. § 7245.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2004).
6. Majed Zeineddine, Piercing the Corporate Attorney's Veil: The Impact to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 131, 135-36 (2003). STE-
PHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 3
(2005). "ABA rules are not binding on any jurisdiction... The courts of each state adopt the
state's rules of professional conduct." Id. The ABA creates the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct as a guide for attorney conduct. Id. The courts of each state adopt the state's rules of
professional conduct. Id; see also James W. Semple, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 53 F.D.C.C. Q. 419, 423 (2003) (noting that SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt
stated publicly on September 20, 2002 that if state bar licensing agencies would not discipline
attorneys, the SEC would assume that task). Only attorneys practicing before the SEC are sub-
ject to the SEC rules and consequently, federal regulation. Id.
7. 17 C.F.R. § 205; see Litt, supra note 2, at C-10 (stating that the new SEC rules place the
lawyer in an adversary position to a corporate client); see also John Paul Lucci, 4th and 205: How
a Rush of Global Comments Blocked the SEC's First Attempted Punt of Attorney-Client Privilege
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, 20 ToURO. L. REV. 363, 381-82 (2004). Section 205.3(b) imposes a duty
on an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of the securities law or breach of fiduci-
ary duty within the corporation to the chief legal officer (CLO). Id. This provision establishes
that the attorney's client is the shareholder of the corporation and not necessarily its officers or
employees. Id.
8. Litt, supra note 2, at C-6.
9. These proposed regulations are commonly referred to as "noisy withdrawal" but have not
been implemented by the SEC. Litt, supra note 2, at C-6 (stating that "[t]his is a dramatic
reversal of the attorney-client privilege, one that goes to the core of the attorney-client
relationship").
10. Litt, supra note 2, at C-7; see also, MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003). In 2003
ABA Model Rule 1.6, the general provision addressing client confidences, was amended to pro-
vide limited exceptions where a lawyer may breach client confidentiality. Id. The main excep-
tion to ABA Model Rule 1.6 has traditionally been to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm. Id. However, the 2003 amendments added "to prevent the client from
committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the finan-
cial interests . . ." Id.; see also, Litt supra note 2, at C-7. Before the 2003 amendment, ABA
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The attorney plays a critical role in counseling a corporate client
regarding compliance, remedy for non-compliance, and cooperation
with government investigations of corporate wrongdoing." However,
the SEC rules jeopardize the corporate attorney's role as counselor. 12
For example, when investigating a claim of a material violation of the
federal securities laws, the SEC often requests the assistance of the
corporation by seeking confidential communication regarding the ma-
terial violation. 13 The corporate attorney may negotiate a confidenti-
ality agreement with the SEC to ensure that any disclosed privileged
information will be used only for the SEC investigation.' 4 While not
new, the use of confidentiality agreements in corporate investigations
is of increasing importance in light of the disclosure and reporting re-
quirements outlined in the Act and SEC rules. 15 These confidentiality
agreements protect the corporation's privileged information from
public release while still assisting the SEC in determining whether to
Model Rule 1.13 addressed the particular situation of a lawyer representing an organization
where the attorney knows that an officer or employee of the company is engaged in action,
intends to act or refuses to act in manner that is related to the lawyer's representation that is a
violation of law. Id. The rule suggested that the attorney ask for reconsideration on the matter,
advise that a separate legal opinion should be sought, or refer the mater to a higher authority in
the organization. Id. The rule permitted, but did not require a lawyer to withdraw. Id.
11. MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2003); see also, Zeineddine, supra note 6, at
148 (discussing the importance of the attorney-client relationship under the old ABA Mode
Code of Professional Responsibility). But see John K. Villa, Ethical Issues for Inside Counsel
Analysisin Corp. Couns. Guidelines § 3 (2005). It should be noted that Rules 1.6 and 1.13 do
not apply to lawyers who have been retained to investigate alleged violations of law or to defend
the corporation against any claim arising out of the alleged violation. Id.
12. Lauren C. Cohen, Note, In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client Privilege: How
Sarbanes-Oxley Misses the Point, 9 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 297, 313 (2004). "The SEC is essen-
tially asking the corporate attorney to sniff out fraud and act as a government watchdog. This
automatically breaks the trust between the client corporation and the attorney and thereby be-
tween the client's agents, corporate managers, and the attorney." Id. at 312-13.
13. Joshua R. Hochberg, Interview with United States Attorney James Comey concerning the
Department of Justice's Policy on Requesting Corporations Under Criminal Investigation to Waive
the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection, in THE A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION AND THE CENTER FOR CONTINUINO LEGAL EDUCATION, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 2004,
at L-13, L-13.
14. Semple, supra note 6, at 427 (discussing the SEC's proposed § 205.3(e)(3) providing that
an issuer would not waive any applicable privileges by sharing confidential information with the
SEC about misconduct by the issuer's employees or officers, pursuant to a confidentiality agree-
ment); see also Beth Dorris, Note, The Limited Waiver Rule: Creation of an SEC-Corporation
Privilege, 36 STAN. L. REV. 789, 794 (1984) (noting that after the Watergate scandal, the SEC
created a program of voluntary disclosure to cut enforcement costs resulting from increased
investigations).
15. See generally Sue Reisinger, Waiving Privilege Good-Bye, 3 CORP. COUNS. 117 (2003); see
also Dorris, supra note 14, at 789 (discussing the SEC's limited waiver rule allowing corporations
that disclose attorney-client information to the SEC to maintain the privileged status of those
communications after such disclosure).
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pursue or dismiss its investigation. 16 They also encourage the corpo-
rate attorneys to comply with the government's pressure to disclose. 17
Courts disagree, however, as to the enforceability of these confiden-
tiality agreements. 18 The circuit courts are deeply split on whether
disclosure of privileged information to the government made in the
course of an investigation, whether pursuant to a confidentiality
agreement or not, waives the privilege as to all other parties.' 9 On
one hand, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals follows the traditional
waiver rule holding that a waiver of privilege as to one opponent
waives the privilege for all parties.20 While, on the other hand, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applies the selective waiver doctrine
and protects attorney-client and work product disclosures made to the
SEC so long as the disclosures are made pursuant to a confidentiality
agreement. 21
This Comment supports upholding confidentiality agreements and
allowing selective waiver of the attorney-client privilege to further the
goals of the Act while minimizing the effect to attorney-client commu-
nications. 22 Part II explores the background of the rules and legisla-
tion controlling attorney conduct and discusses a history of the
attorney-client privilege. 23 This section also provides a brief back-
ground to recent cases exposing the circuit split on the applicability of
confidentiality agreements. 24 Part III discusses the courts' reasoning
and professional commentaries behind upholding or striking down
confidentiality agreements.25 Further, this section suggests that up-
16. Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. CIV.A.18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (Del. Ch.
June 10, 2002), affd, CIV.A. 18554, 2005 WL 583742 (Del. 2005).
17. Id. at *6.
18. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 307 (6th
Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting). "It is true that only one circuit court of appeals has imple-
mented a government investigation exception to the third party waiver rule. Yet, it is equally
true that one other circuit court of appeals has expressly contemplated a government investiga-
tion exception where, as here, the holder of the privilege [sic] information executes a confidenti-
ality agreement with the government before disclosure." Id. (citation omitted).
19. Id. at 307 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 289.
21. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978); see also Semple,
supra note 6, at 427; see also Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. CIV.A.18553, 2002 WL
31657622 (upholding selective waiver rule for disclosure made to SEC pursuant to a confidential-
ity agreement).
22. See infra notes 202-247 and accompanying text; see also Semple, supra note 6, at 423
(quoting Chancellor Chandler in Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. CIV.A.18553, 2002 WL
31657622, that such a rule "encourages cooperation with law enforcement agencies without any
negative cost to society or to private plaintiffs").
23. See infra notes 28-124 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 125-185 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 186-199 and accompanying text.
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holding confidentiality agreements between a corporate client and the
government protects the attorney-client privilege from further dimi-
nution and also advances the purpose of legislation governing corpo-
rate disclosure. 26 Proposed in Part IV is a legislative solution to the
circuit split outlining a new federal statute specifically upholding con-
fidentiality agreements27 and Part V provides conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND
This section first discusses the Act and the legislative intent. Sec-
ond, this section examines the requirements of the current and pro-
posed version of SEC Rule 205. Third, it explores the corporate
attorney-client privilege. Fourth, this section considers the SEC's pro-
cess for investigating corporations suspected of violations and the
SEC's use of confidentiality agreements to access privileged corporate
communications. Finally, this section dissects cases addressing the se-
lective waiver doctrine via confidentiality agreements.
A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
In the wake of the financial disasters of 2001 and 2002,28 small in-
vestors and middle-class workers witnessed the death of their 401Ks
and consequently, looked to Congress to restore confidence in the
market and in corporate America. 29 The Act is one of the most signif-
icant pieces of legislation governing the United States securities mar-
kets since the 1930s and was designed to "crack down on all of the
Enron-WorldCom-Global Crossing chicanery. '30 Most significantly,
the Act seeks to regulate the accounting and business professions and
provides for tough criminal penalties for violations of the Act.31
At the urging of forty lawyers who wrote to Congress, the Act in-
cluded a provision regarding attorney conduct.32 Accordingly, in its
first effort to regulate attorney conduct, Congress outlined in § 307 of
the Act the "Rules of Professional Responsibility for Attorneys. '33
26. See infra notes 201-247 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 248-267 and accompanying text.
28. Lucci, supra note 7, at 365.
29. Cohen, supra note 12, at 307.
30. Lucci, supra note 7, at 365 (quoting John Paul Lucci, The Crooked E: The Unshredded
Truth About Enron (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 5, 2003)). Chicanery is defined as deception
by trickery or sophistry. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 242 (3d ed. 1993).
31. Lucci, supra note 7, at 376 (noting that Congress set out new duties and responsibilities for
public corporations and their accountants).
32. See Cohen, supra note 12, at 307 (noting that the forty lawyers stated that behind every
corporate scandal there was a corrupt corporate attorney).
33. Id.
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Section 307 has two primary purposes. 34 First, § 307 grants the SEC
power to promulgate minimum standards of professional conduct for
attorneys practicing before it. a5 Second, the Act outlines two ele-
ments that the SEC should include in its rules: (1) attorneys who be-
come aware of fraudulent activity must report it to the corporation's
management and (2) if an appropriate response is not given, the attor-
ney must report to an audit committee or the board of directors.3 6
Senators John Edwards, D-NC, Michael Enzi, R-WY, and Jon
Corzine, D-NJ supported Section 307 and articulated that the amend-
ment's purpose was to address failures by bar associations to ade-
quately police corporate lawyers. 37 Noting that the bill's requirements
for attorneys were less onerous than those for accountants, the Sena-
tors repeatedly expressed the collective view that the recent corporate
scandals had occurred with the participation of attorneys.38 Further,
Senator Edwards stated that the lawyer would not be required to re-
port any wrongdoing outside of the company,3 9 and Senator Enzi
specified that the amendment would not require lawyers to report to
the SEC violations of the law by their corporate clients. 40 Thus, the
Act created a "reporting-up" requirement for attorneys to bring evi-
dence of a material violation to the attention of the company's CLO,
CEO, and/or board of directors. Congress believed that while it
sought to create professional responsibility standards for corporate at-
torneys, it also understood that it needed to protect the attorney-client
relationship because of corporate counsel's essential role in corporate
compliance.41
B. SEC Rule 205
Counsel practicing before the SEC has traditionally been bound by
a number of securities regulations, particularly § 10(b)42 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 which forbids insider trading, and
§§ 11(a),43 12(a)2,44 and 17(a)45 of the Securities Exchange Act of
34. Id.
35. Lucci, supra note 7, at 365-66; see also Cohen, supra note 12, at 308 (noting that the most
contentious aspect of the act is the empowerment of the SEC in promulgating these requirement
and setting forth their own minimum standards of conduct).
36. Cohen, supra note 12, at 308.
37. Lucci, supra note 7, at 376.
38. Id. at 379 (noting that accountants are required to report material violations to the SEC).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Cohen, supra note 12, at 309.
42. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 j(b) (1995).
43. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k(a) (2002).
44. 15 U.S.C.A. § 771(a)(2) (2002).
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1933, which provide principal responsibilities for preparing securities-
related documents.46 Further, under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, attor-
neys are obligated to carefully scrutinize securities filings, corpora-
tion's financial reports, disclosure documents, registration statements,
forward-looking statements, and the Management Discussion and
Analysis Section of the annual report. 47
The SEC enacted Rule 205 as required by § 307 of the Act.48 Rule
205 outlines the minimum standards of professional conduct for attor-
neys practicing before the SEC in the representation of issuers. 49
Rule 205's main objective is its "up-the-ladder" reporting requirement
for attorneys representing a corporation. 50 Further, the SEC has sug-
gested, but has not yet implemented, regulations that go beyond the
mandates of § 307 of the Act and require attorneys to withdraw from
representing a corporate client in certain circumstances. 51
45. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a) (2002).
46. Zeineddine, supra note 6, at 135.
47. Id. at 136.
48. See Litt, supra note 2, at C-3.
49. Semple, supra note 6, at 423; see Litt, supra note 2, at C-3 (noting that the SEC rule
applies broadly with an expansive definition of attorneys appearing and practicing before the
commission). The rule is limited to attorneys "appearing and practicing" before the SEC. Id.
However, this term is broader than it appears. It includes:
(i) transacting any business with the Commission, including communications in any
form;
(ii) representing an issuer in a commission administrative proceeding or in connection
with any Commission investigation, inquiry, information request or subpoena;
(iii) providing advice in respect of the United States securities laws or the Commis-
sion's rules or regulations there under regarding any document that the attorney has
notice will be filed with or submitted to, or incorporated into any document that will be
filed with or submitted to, the Commission: or
(iv) advising an issuer as to whether information or a statement, opinion, or other writ-
ing is required under the United States securities laws or the Commission's rules or
regulations thereunder to be filed with or submitted to, or incorporated into any docu-
ment hat will be filed with or submitted to the Commission.
17 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2004).
The Security Exchange Act of 1933 requires that "[i]ssuers of securities making public offerings
for sale in interstate commerce" are required to file with the SEC. Id. § 200.2. Reference to
"issuers" refers to corporations issuing securities subject to 17 C.F.R. § 200.2 (2004). 15 U.S.C.
78c (2005).
50. Lucci, supra note 7, at 380. The rule also incorporates several provisions that are not ex-
plicitly required by § 307 of the Act, but which the SEC believes are important components of
an effective "up-the-ladder" reporting system. Lucci, supra note 7, at 381.
51. Id. at 382.
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1. Up-the-Ladder Reporting
Rule 205.3(b) outlines up-the-ladder reporting which requires attor-
neys to report evidence of a material violation 52 to certain corporate
officers and/or directors. 53 Evidence of a material violation is defined
in Rule 205.2(e) as "credible evidence, based upon which it would be
unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent
attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material
violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur. '5 4
If there is a material violation, the attorney is directed to report to
the issuer's CLO, or to both the CLO and the CEO.55 If the CLO
reasonably concludes that there was no material violation, he or she
must notify the reporting attorney of this conclusion. 56 If the CLO
concludes that a material violation had occurred, was occurring, or
was about to occur, the CLO must take reasonable steps to ensure
that the corporation adopts an appropriate response and must also
advise the reporting attorney of this conclusion. 57 The new rule fur-
ther requires that the reporting attorney report evidence of a material
violation to the issuer's audit committee, another committee of inde-
pendent directors, or the full board of directors if the attorney did not
receive an appropriate response from the CLO within a reasonable
time.58 Further, if the attorney reasonably believed that it would be
futile to report evidence of a material violation to the CLO and/or
CEO, the attorney may report the evidence of a material violation
directly to the corporation's audit committee or board of directors.59
52. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2004). Material violation is defined in §205.2(i) as a "material violation
of an applicable United States federal or state securities law, a material breach of a fiduciary
duty arising under United States federal or state law, or a similar material violation of any
United States federal state law." Id.
53. Id. § 205.3.
54. Id. § 205.2.
55. Id. § 205.3(b)(1); but cf. Semple, supra note 6, at 424 (discussing the proposed rule which
would have required the reporting attorney to retain documentation of his report to the CLO).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (b)(2).
57. Id. The rule also allows the chief legal officer to refer a report of evidence of a material
violation to a qualified legal compliance committee if one has been duly established by the cor-
poration prior to the report of the material violation. Id.
58. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3) (2004); Semple, supra note 6, at 425 (explaining the application of
the rule).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(4); Jenny E. Cieplak & Michael K Hibey, The Sarbanes-Oxley Regu-
lations and Model Rule 1.13: Redundant Complementary?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 715, 718
(2004) (noting that Rule 205.3 has a report-out option similar to ABA Model Rule 1.13 which
allows the attorney to reveal confidential information related to the attorney's representation if
the attorney reasonably believes that such revelations are necessary to prevent a material viola-
tion that will injure the company or stockholders, to prevent perjury, or to rectify the conse-
quences of a material violation).
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2. Noisy Withdrawal
Currently, an attorney is not required to report evidence of a mate-
rial violation to the SEC.60 Section 205(d)(2) of the SEC rules states
that an attorney may reveal confidential information to the SEC in
three circumstances. 61 First, the attorney may release confidential in-
formation if he reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent the issuer
from committing a material violation which would result in injury to
the financial interest of the issuer or investors. 62 Second, the attorney
may release confidential information to prevent the issuer from com-
mitting perjury or an act of fraud upon the SEC when the issuer is
being investigated.63 Third, the attorney may release confidential in-
formation if he reasonably believes that in doing so he may rectify the
effects of a past material violation.64
A noisy withdrawal requirement would oblige outside attorneys to
"report-out" evidence of a material violation. Under such a rule, if
the attorney did not receive a favorable response from the CLO and/
or CEO and the attorney reasonably believed that a material violation
is ongoing or is about to occur, the attorney must withdraw, notify the
SEC, and disaffirm submissions that are tainted by the violation. 65
The proposed SEC "noisy withdrawal" requirement was strongly op-
posed by the legal community arguing that noisy withdrawal surpassed
the mandate given to the SEC in the Act.66 Further, critics fear that
noisy withdrawal would deter clients from seeking legal advice, make
60. Lucci, supra note 7, at 406-07. On January 23, 2003, the SEC issued a media release sum-
marizing Rule 205 which included the up-the-ladder requirement, but did not implement the
noisy withdrawal provision. Id. at 407-08.
61. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (d)(2) (emphasis added).
62. Id. § 205.3 (d)(2)(i) (emphasis added).
63. Id. § 205.3 (d)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). This provision of the Rule also requires that the
attorney "reasonably believe." Id.
64. Id. § 205.3 (d)(2)(iii) (emphasis added).
65. Lucci, supra note 7, at 383-84. The proposed rule distinguishes between in-house counsel
and outside counsel. Id. at 384. Outside attorneys are required to report the evidence of a
material violation to the SEC, while in-house attorneys are required to disaffirm any documents
they have participated in drafting that are tainted by the violation. Id.
66. Id. at 386-87 (noting that more than seventy of the nation's law firms asked the SEC to
reconsider its controversial proposal that would force lawyers to disclose evidence of client
wrongdoing); see also id. at 389-92 (discussing that Senator Enzi, one of § 307's sponsors, specif-
ically stated that 307 was drafted to confine disclosure entirely within the corporation); see also
Comments of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, SEC Release Nos. 33-8150; 34-
46868; IC- 25829; File No. S7-45-02 (Dec. 16, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/
skaddenarpsl.htm.
We respectfully submit that the Commission has gone well beyond the specified re-
quirements and intended purpose of § 307... The Proposed Rules (noisy withdrawal)
will so fundamentally alter the relationship between issuers and their attorneys that the
level of consultation - and thereby the vital flow of information - between issuers'
2006]
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lawyers agents of the SEC,6 7 force lawyers to focus on protecting
themselves from the wrath of the SEC rather than on the client's
needs,68 and deter lawyers from learning as much as possible about
their corporate clients' activities. 69 As a result of this criticism, the
SEC did not include the "noisy withdrawal" in the current version of
Rule 205, but is still considering implementing a similar requirement
in the future.70 However, even without a noisy withdrawal require-
ment, Rule 205 is a departure from conventional corporate law
practice.
C. The American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct
Traditionally, the ABA has been the primary mechanism in address-
ing attorneys' roles in relation to client confidentiality.71 This section
discusses attorney responsibility under ABA Model Rules 1.6 and
1.13. Further, this section compares the duties imposed by SEC Rule
205 with the responsibilities outlined in the 2003 version of Model
Rules 1.6 and 1.13. Rules 1.6 and 1.13 governing client confidentiality
are given effect by the attorney-client privilege. 72 However, rules 1.6
and 1.13 encompass the entire attorney-client relationship, while the
attorney-client privilege applies only in proceedings in which a lawyer
may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence
concerning the client.73
1. Model Rules
The ABA creates the Model Rules and each state may indepen-
dently choose to adopt all or part of the Model Rules. 74 The Model
senior management and business unit heads, on the one hand, and in-house and outside
legal counsel, on the other hand, will inevitably and dramatically decrease.
Id.
67. Lucci, supra note 7, at 391.
68. Id. at 392.
69. Id. Moreover, some critics noted that while Rule 205 was designed to restore investor
confidence, the rule may harm investors by increasing the number of SEC investigations. Id. at
393.
70. Litt, supra note 2, at C-6.
71. See MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCr, Introduction (2003) (noting that the Model Rules are
designed to be a basis for lawyer discipline); see also GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 6, at 4
(discussing the history of various rules, codes and canons promulgated by the ABA outlining
attorney responsibility).
72. MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUC R. 1.6 cmt. (3). "The principle of client-lawyer confidential-
ity is given effect by related bodies of law: the attorney-client privilege, the work product doc-
trine and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics." Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at Preface.
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Rules provide an outline of the role of the attorney as not only an
advocate, but also a negotiator, intermediary, and evaluator.75 Rule
1.6 is the general rule addressing client confidentiality, and Rule 1.13
governs the organizational client. 76 In August 2003, the ABA adopted
a "reporting up" rule for corporate clients. 77 Whether the ABA's pur-
pose was to prevent the SEC from taking further steps to regulate
attorneys 78 or a valid concern over corporate scandals, 79 the revised
ABA rules broaden the circumstances in which a lawyer may disclose
privileged information.80 The new Rule 1.6 also permits disclosure
not just to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm, but also where the lawyer reasonably believes it is necessary to
prevent, mitigate, or rectify the client from committing a crime in
75. Zeineddine, supra note 6, at 136.
76. Litt, supra note 2, at C-6-C-7. Rule 1.6 addresses client confidences. However, the at-
torney-client privilege is an evidentiary privilege and is not specifically governed by the Model
Rules. Rules 1.6 and 1.13 are critical to understanding the protections and obligations implicat-
ing the attorney-client privilege. See also MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 5 (2001). The
old version of Rule 1.6 stated that the lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representa-
tion of a client with only a few limited exceptions outlined in section (b) of Rule 1.6. Litt, supra
note 2, at C-6-C7. Rule 1.6 (b) (1-4) stated:
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
1. To prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
2. To secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these rules;
3. To establish a claim of defense on behalf of the lawyer in controversy between the
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to criminal charge or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct which the client was involved, or to respond to allegation in
any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client
4. To comply with other law or court order.
Id.; see also MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2001). Rule 1.13 governs organizational cli-
ents. The old rule limited corrective measures taken by counsel to remedy the organization's
misconduct to those "designed to minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of re-
vealing information relating to the representation ... " MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13
(2001). Further, the old Model Rule 1.13 required that the lawyer have actual knowledge that an
officer or employee of the organization is engaged in action that is a violation of a legal obliga-
tion to the organization. Id. Finally, the attorney was required to "proceed as reasonably neces-
sary in the best interest of the organization," which may include a request that the organization
re-evaluate the matter or that a different legal opinion be sought. Id. Accordingly, Model Rule
1.13 authorized disclosure of confidential material only when the disclosure would advance the
client's interest. Id.
77. MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 and 1.13 (2003); see Litt, supra note 2, at C-3. The
revisions to Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13 were made at the ABA annual meeting just days after SEC
Rule 205 went into effect. Litt, supra note 2, at C-7. At the urging of the Cheek Commission, a
task force addressing corporate responsibility, the ABA House of Delegates narrowly approved
the changes. Id.
78. Cohen, supra note 12, at 309.
79. Id. at 308. The ABA expressed that the corporate scandals have held to a need for law-
yers to play a significant and heightened role in preventing future corporate misconduct. Id.
80. Litt, supra note 2, at C-7.
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which the client has used the lawyer's services and that is reasonably
certain to result in substantial financial injury to another.81
Further, the ABA amended Rule 1.13 to sharpen the "bedrock
principle of the Model Rules" that the lawyer for an organizational
client represents the organization and must act in the best interest of
that organization. 82 There are two significant changes in revised
Model Rule 1.13.83 First, in the old version of Model Rule 1.13 "re-
porting up" was an option a lawyer could consider when confronted
with fraudulent corporate activity.84 Now under the revised rule, "re-
porting up" is mandatory unless the lawyer "reasonably believes that
it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so."'85
Second, the new rule permits the lawyer to disclose confidences and
secrets to third parties if the lawyer "reasonably believes disclosure is
necessary to prevent substantial injury to the corporation. '86 Model
Rule 1.13 limits this disclosure to circumstances where the attorney
has first revealed the information to the highest governing authority
within the organization and such authority refuses to respond in an
appropriate manner and where the organization may be detrimentally
affected by the violation before the attorney reports outside of the
organization. 87
81. MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.6 (2003) (emphasis added); see also Litt, supra note 2, at
C-7-C-8 (analyzing the changes in Model Rule 1.6).
82. A.B.A., REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE
RESPONSBILITY, Mar. 31, 2003 at 23, available at www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/
final-report.pdf; see also id. at 41. "[T]his obligation is a mandate, the Rule cannot and does not
prescribe precisely what action is appropriate; the lawyer is obligated to exercise informed pro-
fessional judgment in determining what steps are 'reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization.' That can be determined, in specific detail, only in the context of the circumstances
in which the problem arises." Id; see also Cieplak & Hibley, supra note 59, at 717. Model Rule
1.13 imposes substantially similar requirements upon all attorneys that SEC Rule 205 imposes on
attorneys practicing before the SEC. Cieplak & Hibley, supra note 59, at 717.
83. Litt, supra note 2, at C-7-C-8.
84. MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2001); cf MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.13
(2003). "Reporting up" became mandatory in the latter version of the Model Rules. See also
Litt, supra note 2, at C-8-C-9.
85. MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.13 (2003). However, is it unlikely that many lawyers
will argue that he or she reasonably believed that reporting to the executive committee was
unnecessary. See Litt, supra note 2, at C-8. "It would be a brave lawyer indeed who would avail
herself of that exception." Id.; see also A.B.A., supra note 82, at 43 (stating that the Rule should
more actively encourage such action, by requiring that the lawyer refer the matter to higher
authority in the organization - including, if warranted, the organization's highest authority -
unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary to do so). Unlike the relatively
rigid reporting requirements in the Part 205 SEC Rules, proposed Rule 1.13 would continue to
allow the lawyer to exercise professional judgment in determining the appropriate way to pro-
ceed in the best interest of the organization. A.B.A., supra note 82, at 44 n.78.
86. MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.13 (2003); Litt, supra note 2, at C-8-C-9.
87. MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.13(c)(1-2) (2003). The rule requires that the attorney
first try to report within the organization and if such attempt fails and the lawyer "reasonably
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2. Differences between SEC Rule 205 and ABA Model Rules 1.6
and 1.13
While the revised Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13 certainly reflect the
same focus on attorney responsibility in corporate governance as SEC
Rule 205, the SEC rule is broader in several aspects. 88 First, SEC
Rule 205 requires the attorney to report any "evidence of material
violations of which the attorney becomes aware in the course of repre-
senting the issuer."' 89 On the other hand, the ABA Model Rules limit
disclosure to violations relating to the particular attorney's represen-
tation or if the violation involved use of the attorney's services.90 Sec-
ond, the Model Rules appear to apply only when a lawyer has actual
knowledge of a violation or potential violation.91 The SEC's standard
is objective and applies when it would be reasonable for a lawyer to
conclude that a violation occurred or was about to occur.92 Third, the
Rule 205 mandates up-the-ladder reporting, whereas the Model Rules
permit a lawyer to choose not to report up-the-ladder if it is not in the
best interest of the corporation to do so. 93 Finally, the SEC rules are
mandatory and carry sanctions while the Model Rules are simply
guidelines for the states to adopt.94 Once a state adopts all or part of
the rules, they are the binding code of conduct for attorneys in that
state.
believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial financial injury," the law-
yer may report out. Litt, supra note 2, at C-8-C-9. This is somewhat in opposition to Model
Rule 1.6 which does not require that the attorney first report within the organization and the
attorney may disclose information to prevent or rectify substantial injury to the financial inter-
ests or property of a third party. Id. at C-9.
88. Id.
89. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (b)(1) (2004); see also Litt, supra note 2, at C-9.
90. MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.6 and R. 1.13 (2003).
91. Litt, supra note 2, at C-3.
92. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(m); see also Litt, supra note 2, at C-9 (discussing the difference between
the Model Rules and SEC Rule 205).
93. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1); Litt, supra note 2, at C-9.
94. 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(a-d) (outlining sanctions).
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D. The Attorney-Client Privilege95
The attorney-client privilege protects communications shared be-
tween a client and an attorney 96 and has been considered the bedrock
of a lawyer's professional obligations. It is essential both for effective
client representation and smooth functioning of the legal system as a
whole. 97 Subject only to narrow exceptions where a lawyer's services
are being misused by the client to perpetrate a crime or fraud or
where the client has waived the privilege by work or deed, it has been
zealously guarded. 98 The United States Supreme Court has upheld
the attorney-client privilege on numerous occasions. 99 In Upjohn Co.
v. United States, the Court recognized that the attorney-client privilege
applied to the corporate client.100 The Court noted that the attorney-
client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential commu-
nications known to common law10 1 and that the purpose of the attor-
ney-client privilege is to "encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby to promote broader
95. In discussing the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine is often involved.
The work product doctrine is explicitly protected by Federal Rule Civ. P. 26(b)(3), unlike the
attorney-client privilege. In re ColumbiaIHCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293
F.3d 289, 314 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting). The work product doctrine has generally
been recognized as distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 294. "The
doctrine is designed to allow an attorney to 'assemble information, sift what he considers to be
relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue
and needless interference .... .' Id. This comment will only address the attorney-client
privilege, however many cases and articles referenced in this comment also address the work
product doctrine.
96. Jody Okrzesik, Note, Selective Waiver: Should the Government be Privy to Privileged In-
formation Without Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine?, 34 U.
MEM. L. REV. 115, 119 (2003).
97. Litt, supra note 2, at C-1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 68-72 (2000). The Restatement states that the attorney-client privilege protects: (1) a com-
munication; (2) made between privileged persons; (3) in confidence; (4) for the purpose of ob-
taining or providing legal assistance to the client." Id. "Communication" is "any expression
through which a privileged person ... undertakes to convey information to another privileged
person and any document or other record revealing such an expression." Id. § 69. A privileged
person is the client or prospective client, the client's lawyer, agents of either who facilitate com-
munications between then, and agents of the lawyer who facilitate representation. Id. § 70. A
communication is in confidence if "at the time and in the circumstances of the communication,
the communicating person reasonably believes that no one will learn the contents of the commu-
nication except a privileged person." Id. § 71. Obtaining or providing legal assistance for the
client includes any communication made to or to assist a person, "(1) who is a lawyer or who the
client or prospective client reasonably believes to be a lawyer; and (2) whom the client or pro-
spective client consults for the purpose of obtaining legal assistance." Id. § 72.
98. Litt, supra note 2, at C-1.
99. Zeineddine, supra note 6, at 146.
100. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1980).
101. Id. at 389 (citing FED. R. EviD. 501).
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public interests in observance of law and administration of justice." 102
While the Court recognized that complications in the application of
the privilege arise when the client is a corporation, the Court found
that the privilege was necessary for the corporate attorney to formu-
late sound legal advice. 10 3
Because some courts fear that the attorney-client privilege inhibits
the truth-seeking process and results in the loss of testimony, the priv-
ilege is narrowly construed. 10 4 Courts have recognized several mecha-
nisms for waiver of the attorney-client privilege including: (1) client
voluntarily reveals information to a third party;10 5 (2) the attorney
voluntarily reveals information to a third party;106 and (3) implied
waiver when the client attacks his attorney's conduct by calling into
question substance of communications.10 7 Accordingly, while the le-
gal profession highly values the confidentiality of information pro-
vided as part of the attorney-client communication,'0 8 it is not without
limitations.10 9 While the ABA has historically guarded the attorney-
client privilege with fervor, it has recently limited the privilege's appli-
cation to the corporate client.110
It is important to note that the attorney-client privilege is more lim-
ited in its application than the duty of confidentiality under Model
Rules 1.6 and 1.13. The attorney-client privilege governs the use of
information only in the context of an adversarial proceeding and ap-
plies only to the lawyer-client communication made for the purposes
of securing legal advice or assistance."1 While the "up-the-ladder re-
porting" of Rule 205 and Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13 do not per se im-
plicate violations of the attorney-client privilege because the reporting
102. Id. (holding that communications by Upjohn employees to counsel are covered by the
attorney-client privilege where company's attorneys sent questionnaire to and interviewed em-
ployees regarding questionable payments of foreign government officials); see also id. at 389
(noting that the privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and
that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyers being fully informed by the client).
103. Id. at 390 (citing United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 236 U.S. 318 (1915).
104. Todd A. Ellinwood, "In Light of Reason and Experience ": The Case for a Strong Govern-
ment Attorney-Client Privilege, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 1291, 1301 (2001).
105. United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548, 551 (10th Cir. 1979).
106. Id.
107. In re French Bankr., 162 B.R. 541 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1994) (finding waiver when the client
testifies as to attorney's advice).
108. Semple, supra note 6, at 423.
109. Shareholders suing their corporation may discover communications otherwise protected
by the attorney-client privilege upon a showing of good cause. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d
1093, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970). However, the complete removal of the attorney-client privilege
from the grasp of the corporate client would expose corporations to harassment suits by minority
stockholders and may inhibit candid attorney-client communication. See id. at 1104.
110. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
111. MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.6 (2003).
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is done within the organization, the privilege may be affected by a
diminution of the free flow of information between corporate attorney
and management due to worries about confidentiality. 112 The corpo-
rate client may be less than honest with the attorney where the client
is aware of the attorney's duty to report potential violations "up-the-
ladder."113
E. Corporate Cooperation in SEC Proceedings
In January 2003, the Deputy Attorney General, Larry Thompson,
issued a Department of Justice ("DOJ") memo ("Thompson Memo")
discussing the factors considered in determining whether to seek fed-
eral prosecution of corporations. 1 4 One of the factors the DOJ con-
siders is the cooperation and voluntary disclosure of information by
the corporation. 115
The DOJ's controversial definition of cooperation 1 6 includes, as a
gauge of cooperation, the company's willingness not to invoke the at-
torney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine." 7 United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, James Comey,
stated in an interview that prosecutors will consider whether the cor-
112. Cieplak & Hibley, supra 59, at 722 (noting that some concerns have been raised that
conflicts between the corporation's officer and lawyers where management fears that the attor-
ney may blow the whistle at any time and thus are more reluctant to communicate with the
lawyers). But see id. at 726 (stating that concerns over communication issues resulting from the
disclosure requirements of Rule 205 and the 2003 Model Rules are unfounded).
113. Id. (noting that some commentators suggest that the independence of the bar may be
compromised if lawyers are required to assist the government in the investigation of crimes).
114. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson on Principles of Fed-
eral Prosecution of Business Organizations (January 20, 2003), available at www.usdoj.gov/dag/
cftf/businessorganizations.pdf [hereinafter Thompson Memo].
115. Id. The factors outlined in the memo are the following: (1) nature and seriousness of the
offense; (2) pervasiveness of the wrongdoing within the corporation; (3) corporation's past his-
tory; (4) cooperation and voluntary disclosure; (5) corporate compliance programs; (6) offers of
restitution and remediation; (7) collateral consequences; (8) adequacy of prosecuting responsible
individuals; and (9) non-criminal alternatives. Id.; see also Dale Oesterle, Early Observations on
the Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of 2002-2003: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer's
Class with Donaldson Over Turf the Choice of Civil or Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of
Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443, 476-77 (discussing the factors considered by
the DOJ).
116. See Hochberg, supra note 13, at L-13. In an interview, United States Attorney James
Comey stated that one factor for prosecutors to consider is whether and to what extent the
corporation cooperated with the government's investigation. Id.
117. Thompson Memo, supra note 114. "In gauging the extent of the corporation's coopera-
tion, the prosecutor may consider the corporation's willingness to identify the culprits within the
corporation, including senior executives; to make witnesses available; to disclose the complete
results of its internal investigation; and to waive attorney-client and work product protection."
Id.; see also Oesterle, supra note 115, at 476-477. "The Justice Department includes as a gauge
of cooperation the company's willingness not to invoke the attorney-client privilege and attorney
work-product protection." Oesterle, supra note 115, at 477.
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poration turned over documentation of any internal investigations
that the corporation conducted and whether the corporation waived
privileges.118 Further, Comey specifically stated that while waiver is
not required as a measure of cooperation, prosecutors will sometimes
ask the corporation to provide information that is generally consid-
ered privileged. 1 9 The DOJ's measure of cooperation extends to the
corporation's cooperation with other government agencies, specifi-
cally the SEC.120
Moreover, in October of 2003, the SEC issued its own "Statement
on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Deci-
sions" discussing the waiver of privileges and setting forth a number of
criteria it considers when determining whether to give credit for self-
reporting.121 Among the criteria that the SEC considers are: (1) na-
ture of the misconduct; (2) source of the misconduct; (3) length of
misconduct; (4) extent of the harm caused; (5) detection of the mis-
conduct; and (6) internal corporate remedy for the misconduct. 22
The SEC noted that it does not view a company's waiver of privilege
as an end in itself but only as a means to provide relevant, and some-
times critical, information as to the corporation's internal remedy and
detection of the misconduct. 123 While both the SEC and DOJ insist
that waiver of privilege is not required for cooperation, corporate at-
torneys are aware of the well-known incentives to cooperate with a
government investigation and fear that the corporation will be treated
harshly if their cooperation is deemed inadequate. 124
F. Courts Differ in Treatment of Confidentiality Agreements and
Selective Waiver
In order to conform to the cooperation requirements outlined by
the SEC and other government agencies, a corporation will often re-
118. Hochberg, supra note 13, at L-13.
119. Id. In response to the question, "Don't you sometimes ask the corporation to provide
information that is classic attorney-client privilege, i.e. counsel's advice to the corporation?"
Comey stated, "Yes, but rarely." Id. at L-14. Comey suggested that the Department of Justice
may ask for privileged information in situations where the corporation is claiming that it en-
gaged in a good faith reliance on counsel. Id.
120. Thompson Memo, supra note 114.
121. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and the Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cioperation to Agency Enforcement
Decisions, SEC Release No. 44969 (October 23, 2001), at n.3, available at www.sec.gov/litigation/
investreport/34-44969.htm [hereinafter SEC Release No. 44969].
122. Id. at 2. The SEC qualified the stated criteria by stating that these were just factors and
not necessarily determinative of whether the SEC will give credence to self-reporting and waiver
of privileges. Id.
123. Id. at n.3; see also Litt, supra note 2, at C-2.
124. Litt, supra note 2, at C-2.
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lease privileged information pursuant to a confidentiality agree-
ment.12 5 These agreements generally state that the release of
attorney-client information or work product to the SEC does not con-
stitute a waiver of the privilege. 126 Thus, the SEC is barred from re-
leasing the information to other parties. While the SEC has indicated
its support of such a practice, 127 some courts have declined to uphold
confidentiality agreements stating that once a client waives the privi-
lege as to one party, the privilege is waived as to all parties. 2 8
Courts have long been addressing the issue of whether clients waiv-
ing the attorney-client privilege as to the government should be al-
lowed to maintain the privilege as to everyone else.129 However, with
the introduction of the Act and SEC Rule 205, courts have a new
perspective in addressing whether to uphold confidentiality agree-
ments because of the increased emphasis on attorney responsibility in
identifying, addressing, and remedying corporate wrongdoing. Both
sides of the debate support their respective opinions by citing policy,
125. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
126. See Dorris, supra note 14, at 797 (discussing the limited waiver rule which allows corpora-
tions to share their confidential attorney-client communications with the SEC without having to
waive the privileged status of these communications against other parties). Dorris uses the term
"limited" waiver to mean what this comment terms as "selective" waiver. The confidentiality
agreement also often encompasses the work product protected materials.
127. SEC Release No. 44969, supra note 121, at n.3. The SEC filed an amicus brief, Brief of
SEC as Amicus Curiae, McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 99-C-7980-3 (Ga. Ct. App. filed May 13,
2001), arguing that the provision of privileged information to the commission pursuant to a con-
fidentiality agreement did not necessarily waive the privilege as to third parties. Id.; see gener-
ally Dorris, supra note 14 (discussing cases from the 1980's where the SEC utilized
confidentiality agreements).
128. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 294 (6th
Cir. 2002). "As a general rule, the 'attorney-client privilege is waived by voluntary disclosure of
private communications by an individual or corporation to third parties."' Id. (quoting In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, October 12, 1995, 78 F.3d 251, 254 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also Westing-
house Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 n.7 (3d. Cir. 1991).
Some courts have distinguished between waivers which permit the client who has disclosed privi-
leged communications to one party to continue asserting the privilege against other parties and
waivers which allow the client who has disclosed a portion of privileged communication to con-
tinue asserting the privilege as to the remaining portions of the same communications. Id.; see
also In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 295 (finding that corporation could not selectively waive
attorney-client privilege by releasing otherwise privileged documents to government agencies
during investigation, but continue to assert privilege as to other parties); see also Saito v. McKes-
son HBOC, Inc., No. CIV.A.18553, 2002 WL 31657622 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 2002), affid, CIV.A.
18554, 2005 WL 583742 (Del. Mar. 8, 2005) (noting that Delaware Supreme Court has already
determined that it is unfair to allow for partial waivers, but finding that disclosures made to the
SEC pursuant to a confidentiality agreement should remain privileged as to other parties). This
comment will only address "selective waivers," which allow a party the client who has disclosed
privileged communications to one party to continue asserting the privilege against other parties.
129. See Dorris, supra note 14, at 797-798 n.41 (1984) (citing cases from the middle 1970's and
early 1980's addressing the applicability of confidentiality agreements with the government).
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Supreme Court precedent, and the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege.
1. Courts Declining to Adopt a Selective Waiver Theory
The Third and Sixth Circuits have declined to adopt a theory of
selective waiver where a corporation releases information to the gov-
ernment, but wishes to retain the privilege as to other parties.130 The
circuits strictly interpret the traditional waiver doctrine to find that
once the privilege is waived, it is always waived. The courts bolster
this argument by asserting that the reasoning behind confidentiality
agreements does not further the purpose of the attorney-client privi-
lege.13 ' Finally, the courts see confidentiality agreements as dis-
advantaging private plaintiffs. 132
Courts declining to uphold confidentiality agreements often cite the
Third Circuit's 1991 decision in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Repub-
lic of the Philippines.133 The Westinghouse court found that voluntary
disclosure to a third party of privileged information was inconsistent
with an assertion of the privilege and that by disclosing documents to
the SEC containing privileged communication, Westinghouse waived
the attorney-client privilege.' 34 In Westinghouse, the SEC investigated
the company for illegal payments made to obtain a contract in connec-
130. The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia refused to allow selective waiver of privi-
leged information to the SEC. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
The company exchanged letters with the SEC where the SEC stated that it would not deliver the
documents to any person other than a member of the SEC, another governmental body or Con-
gress without first giving notice to Occidental of its intentions to deliver the documents to a
person other than the SEC, government or Congress. Id. at 1217. However, there was no confi-
dentiality agreement negotiated between the parties. Id.; see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951
F.2d at 1425 (stating that selective waiver does not serve the purpose of encouraging full disclo-
sure to one's attorney in order to obtain informed legal assistance and extends the privilege
beyond its intended purpose). In Westinghouse, there was no formal confidentiality agreement
entered into between Westinghouse and the SEC. Id. at 1418. However, at the time, the SEC
regulations stated that "information or documents obtained by the SEC in the course of an
investigation examination, unless made a matter of public record, shall be deemed non-public,"
and would not be disclosed without authorization. Id. at 1418 n.4; see also In re Columbia/HCA,
293 F.3d at 302 (declining to adopt selective waiver).
131. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 951 F.2d at 1423 (stating that voluntary disclosure to a third
party of privileged communications is inconsistent with the assertion of the privilege).
132. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 302 (quoting Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d
1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981) that the "client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his oppo-
nents, waiver the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality as to others, or
to invoke the privilege as to communications whose confidentiality he has already compromised
for his own benefit.").
133. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 951 F.2d at 1418.
134. Id. at 1423. The court also found that Westinghouse had waived the work product pro-
tection. Id.
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tion with a Philippine nuclear plant. 135 Westinghouse's attorneys136
released privileged information to the SEC 137 relying upon the SEC's
confidentiality regulations providing that information or documents
obtained by the SEC in the course of any investigation or examina-
tion, unless made a matter of public record, are deemed non-public. 138
The Republic of the Philippines subsequently brought suit against
Westinghouse in 1988 and requested privileged documents that West-
inghouse had made available to the SEC.139
In reaching its decision, the court looked to the purpose behind the
attorney-client privilege. 140 The court held that encouraging full and
frank communication, the traditionally purported purpose of the at-
torney-client privilege, was merely a means to achieve the ultimate
purpose, which the court stated is the promotion of a broader public
interest in the observance of law and administration of justice. 141 Fur-
ther, the court stated that because the attorney-client privilege ob-
structs the truth-finding process, it should apply only to those
disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice. 142 Specifically,
the Westinghouse court stated that selective waiver does not en-
courage full and frank disclosure to one's attorney in order to obtain
informed legal assistance. 143 Rather, it furthers voluntary disclosure
to the government which is not the purpose of the attorney-client priv-
ilege. 144 Accordingly, the court found that Westinghouse's voluntary
135. Id. at 1418.
136. Id. In March 1978, Westinghouse retained the law firm Kirkland & Ellis to conduct an
internal investigation into whether company official had made improper payments. Id. In the
course of the internal investigation, Kirkland & Ellis produced two letters reporting its findings.
Id. These letters include communications between the attorneys and officers and employees of
the corporation. Id.
137. Concurrently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) also began an investigation and Westing-
house also released privileged information to the DOJ. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 951 F.2d at
1414, 1419. In 1986, the DOJ reactivated its 1978 investigation after deposing Ferdinand Marco,
the president of the Philippines at the time. Id. Westinghouse entered into a confidentiality
agreement with the DOJ to preserve the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine,
and subsequently released privileged information to the government. Id.
138. Id. at 1418 n.4. The court quoted the provision in 17 C.F.R. §203.2 (1978), which stated
that, "information or documents obtained by the Commission in the course of any investigation
or examination, unless made a matter of public record, shall be deemed non-public." Id. While
this provision is still good law, it is not often invoked without a corresponding confidentiality
agreement. Further, it does not specifically address the issue of waiver of privileged information.
139. Id. at 1420.
140. Id. at 1423.
141. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 951 F.2d at1423 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
142. Id. at 1423.
143. Id. at 1424.
144. Id. The court quoted the D.C. Circuit court in Permian Corp. v. United States and stated
that "selective waiver 'has little to do with' the privilege's purpose - protecting the confidential-
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disclosures to the SEC were inconsistent with an assertion of the at-
torney-client privilege and allowed the Republic of the Philippines ac-
cess to the information. 145
In In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig. ,146
the Sixth Circuit followed the Third Circuit's approach in Westing-
house and rejected the idea of selective waiver of attorney-client privi-
leged information.1 47 The DOJ began investigating Columbia/HCA in
the mid 1990s for possible Medicare fraud.' 48  The company con-
ducted several internal audits of its Medicare patient records which it
agreed to produce to the Government.149 In exchange for this cooper-
ation, the DOJ agreed that certain stringent confidentiality provisions
would govern its obtainment of the documents. 150 However, numer-
ous lawsuits were filed throughout the country by private litigants who
wanted Columbia to produce the audits. 151
In declining to uphold the confidentiality agreement, the court rea-
soned that the attorney-client privilege is a matter of common law
right and is not a creature of contract. 152 The Third Circuit's reason-
ing was similar to the Sixth Circuit's reasoning stating that a selective
waiver rule has "little, if any, relation to fostering frank communica-
tion between a client and his or her attorney. ' 153 The court felt that
any form of selective waiver, even that which stems from a confidenti-
ality agreement, transforms the attorney-client privilege into merely
another brush on an attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated to
ity of attorney-client communications in order to encourage clients to obtain informed legal
assistance." Id. (quoting Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
145. Id. at 1425. But see, Okrzesik, supra note 96, at 133-34 (discussing two scenarios where
the Westinghouse court might have reached a different conclusion: when the disclosure is inad-
vertent or made to a non-adversary, and when there is conscious disregard of the confidentiality
of the material).
146. 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002). This case deals with the DOJ, however the decision is
relevant to whether confidentiality agreements should be honored in SEC proceedings. The
DOJ and SEC consider similar criteria in determining whether to prosecute or investigate corpo-
rations. See supra Part II.E., notes 114-124 and accompanying text. Further, the corporation's
cooperation in an SEC matter is considered in the DOJ's factors. Id.
147. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 302 (6th
Cir. 2002). The court also found that the corporation had waived work product protection as
well. Id.
148. Id. at 291.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 292. The agreement stated that: "the disclosure of any report, document, or infor-
mation by one party to the other does not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege ......
Id.
151. Id.
152. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 303 (noting that the attorney-client privilege is not a
creature of contract, arranged between the parties to suit the whim of the moment).
153. Id. at 302.
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gain tactical or strategic advantage.154 While the Westinghouse court
declined to base their finding on the "fairness" issue,'5 5 the Sixth Cir-
cuit specifically articulated that a private litigant stands in nearly the
same stead as the government and should be allowed the same access
to the information.156
2. Courts Adopting Selective Waiver
The Eighth Circuit, the Northern District of California, 15 7 and Dela-
ware state courts have found that the public policy of encouraging dis-
closure, the purpose of the attorney-client privilege, and the lack of a
threat of harm to individual plaintiffs support upholding selective
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work product
doctrine pursuant to confidentiality agreements with the govern-
ment. 58 Further, there is clearly an economic benefit associated with
upholding selective waiver in the reduced costs of investigations by
the government.15 9
154. Id.
155. See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d.
Cir. 1991). The court referred to Permian v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214,1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
decision stating, "that the client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents
waiving the privilege for some ad resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to obstruct others
.... " Id.
156. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 303.
157. In re McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 99-CV-20743. 2005 WL934331, at * 1 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
31, 2005). In re McKesson's holding specifically adopted a selective waiver rule for attorney
work-product information. Id. at *10. However, the Court found that the attorney-client privi-
lege did not apply to the communications sought to be protected and thus, the waiver rule could
not be applied. Id. at *8-*9. Much of the analysis supporting selective waiver as to work-prod-
uct information is applicable to attorney-client information.
158. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that the
company only waived the privilege as to the SEC because holding otherwise would "have the
effect of thwarting the developing procedure of corporations to employ independent outside
counsel to investigate and advise them"). There was not an expressed confidentiality agreement
between the SEC and the company. See generally Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc, No.
CIV.A.18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 2002), affd, CIV.A. 18554, 2005 WL
583742 (Del. Mar. 8, 2005) (finding that it is in the best interest of the shareholders to encourage
corporate compliance and therefore adopting a selective waiver rule for disclosures made to the
government pursuant to a confidentiality agreement). In Saito, McKesson did enter into a confi-
dentiality agreement with the SEC. Id at *1. The court discussed the communications, informa-
tion, and documents in question under the work product doctrine, but expressed that the
communications which would fall under the attorney-client privilege also were protected under
the same rationales expressed under the work product doctrine. Id. at *12; see also In re McKes-
son HBOC, Inc., No. 99-CV-20743. 2005 WL934331, at * 10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005) (uphold-
ing selective waiver agreement as to attorney work product but finding that the attorney-client
privilege did not apply to the material because McKesson had not communicated the informa-
tion to its attorneys in confidence because McKesson had already agreed to release the informa-
tion to the SEC).
159. See Janet L. Hall, "Limited Waiver" of Protection Afforded by the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege and the Work Product Doctrine, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 981, 996 (discussing how a selective
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As early as 1978, some courts have recognized the benefits of up-
holding a selective waiver rule. In Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Mere-
dith, the Eight Circuit found that since the company voluntarily
surrendered certain material protected by the attorney-client privilege
to the SEC in a non-public investigation, the company only gave a
selective waiver. 160 There, Diversified sought to protect from the
Weatherhead Corporation a memorandum prepared by its law firm. 161
In 1975, the SEC conducted an official investigation of Diversified
regarding a "slush fund" which was allegedly used to bribe the
purchasing agent of other business entities including Weatherhead. 162
Diversified hired a law firm to make a detailed investigation of the
corporation's business practices and report to the board of direc-
tors.163 Diversified released information from the attorney's investi-
gation pursuant to an SEC subpoena. 164 The court found that
Diversified expressed an expectation of privacy in protecting the privi-
leged material in that it only released the information to the SEC in a
nonpublic investigation. 165 The court was not concerned with fairness
to private litigants and noted that private litigants were not foreclosed
from obtaining the same information from non-privileged sources by
examining business documents, deposing corporate employees, inter-
viewing nonemployees, and obtaining preexisting documents and fi-
nancial records prepared by Diversified for a purpose other than
communicating with the law firm.166 Thus, the court found that Diver-
sified had authorized only a selective waiver of the attorney-client
privilege by releasing information to the SEC in a non-public
investigation. 167
In Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., the Delaware Chancery Court
upheld selective waiver rule relating to attorney-client privileged in-
formation. 68 The court stated that such a rule benefited law enforce-
waiver rule will reduce investigation costs to the government and increases the amount of infor-
mation that is released, if only to the government, by the corporation).
160. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978).
161. Id. at 600.
162. Id. Two lawsuits had been filed against Diversified regarding the alleged "slush fund."
Id.
163. Id. In conducting its investigation, the law firm conducted many interviews with employ-
ees and executives. Id.
164. Id. at 611 (noting that the information was surrendered in a nonpublic investigation).
165. Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 611.
166. Id.
167. Id. "To hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure of
corporations to employ independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order to
protect stockholders, potential stockholders and customers." Id.
168. Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc, No. CIV.A.18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 25, 2002), affd, CIV.A. 18554, 2005 WL 583742 (Del. Mar. 8, 2005).
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ment agencies and encouraged corporate compliance. 169 Saito, a
McKesson shareholder, sought access to documents over which Mc-
Kesson had asserted attorney-client privilege. 170 The SEC conducted
an informal inquiry into whether McKesson HBOC had filed materi-
ally false or misleading financial statements. 171 McKesson's attorneys
disclosed information as to their internal investigation to the SEC pur-
suant to confidentiality agreements. 172 Saito filed a derivative suit and
requested access to the information that McKesson released to the
SEC. 173
In finding that communications released pursuant to the confidenti-
ality agreement were privileged as to Saito, the court noted that the
disclosing party's expectations of privacy are heightened when the
party secures a confidentiality agreement before agreeing to disclose
the information. 174 Further, the court stated that from a policy per-
spective, private plaintiffs are not disadvantaged, but rather benefit
because the SEC my more efficiently protect the integrity of capital
markets. 175 Litigating shareholders cannot "have their cake and eat it
too."'1 76 The court noted that shareholders want disclosing parties to
continue disclosing to the SEC so that they are better protected, but at
the same time they want access to these disclosures for their own tacti-
cal advantage. 177 The court specifically rebutted the Sixth Circuit's
fairness to litigants reasoning stating that a private plaintiff pursuing
litigation is in the same position that they would have been if no dis-
169. Id. at *8. A selective waive rule is such a rule that benefits law enforcement agencies
such as the SEC. Id. It encourages corporations to disclose their internal infestation confiden-
tially allowing the SEC to resolve the investigations expeditiously. Id. Thus, the SEC benefits
from a substantial savings in time and resources, and can resolve a higher volume of investiga-
tions. Id. The court also found that the selective waiver rule applied to work product protected
information. Id.
170. Id. at *1. Saito also wish to gain access to documents which McKesson felt were covered
by the work product doctrine. Id.
171. Id. McKesson hired Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP and Price-
waterhouseCoopers LLP to conduct an internal investigation of the alleged wrongdoing. Id.
Shortly after McKesson merged with HBOC, McKesson HBOC announced the first of three
downward revisions of revenues, earnings, net income and other financial information for 1996-
1998. Id.
172. Id.
173. Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *1.
174. Id. at *6 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1992)).
175. Id. at *9. "Because of the SEC's savings and efficiency, greater protection is afforded to
the beneficiaries that it was designed to protect-investing shareholders such as plaintiff Saito."
Id. The court also references the SEC's amicus brief which stated that it saved several hundred
hours, used half the number of staff to investigate, and complete the investigation of McKesson
much earlier than it would have done without the confidential disclosure in this case. Id. at *8
n.55.
176. Id. at *9.
177. Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *10.
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closure had been made and even hinted that the plaintiff may have
already received the benefit of the disclosure.'
78
In the recent and related case, In re McKesson HBOC, Inc., the
District Court for the Northern District of California followed the
Delaware Chancery Court in Saito, and upheld a selective waiver
agreement between McKesson and the SEC as to attorney work prod-
uct. 179 In its discussion, the court found persuasive Judge Boggs's dis-
sent in In re Columbia/HCA which recognized a distinction between
disclosure to a private entity (resulting in waiver) and disclosure to a
government entity pursuant to a confidentiality agreement (maintain-
ing work product protection). 80 In re McKesson involved the same
communications and information to which Saito sought access to a
report compiled by Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom ("Skad-
den"), the law firm hired by McKesson to review its accounting poli-
cies, circumstances and procedures involved in McKesson's merger
with HBOC for which it was under investigation by the SEC.l8' Prior
to producing its report, Skadden and McKesson agreed to release the
report to the SEC upon its completion pursuant to a confidentiality
agreement with the SEC.182 Because McKesson agreed to release the
information prior to the communications having been made to the
Skadden attorneys, the court found that the communications were not
made in confidence and that the attorney-client privilege did not ap-
ply to protect the information. 18 3 However, the court did find that the
Skadden report was protected by the work product doctrine which
had been only selectively waived as to the SEC.' s4 While the district
court clearly limited its holding to the work product doctrine, it cited
with support Judge Boggs's dissent in In re Columbia/HCA which ad-
dressed the attorney-client privilege. 185 Accordingly, the case is help-
ful in analyzing the reasons supporting the selective waiver doctrine.
178. Id.
179. In re McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 99-CV-20743, 2005 WL 934331, at * 1 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
31, 2005).
180. Id. at *9.
181. Id. at *1.
182. Id. at *3.
183. In re McKesson HBOC, 2005 WL 934331, at * 3.
184. Id. at *10. "This court's determination that McKesson did not waive its work product
protection as to all adversaries when it disclosed the Skadden Report and Back-up Materials to
the government under the terms of the letter agreement is in accord with the conclusions
reached by the Court of Chancery in Delaware in Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc." Id.
185. Id. at *4-*10. Most of the cases that have dealt with the selective waiver issue have
considered both the attorney-client privilege and work product protection.
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III. ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the reasoning of the courts in either adopting
or refusing to adopt a selective waiver theory. Second, this section
discusses why the position of the Eighth Circuit, California federal dis-
trict court, and Delaware state courts is the better approach by ad-
dressing the concerns raised by the Third and Sixth Circuits. Finally,
this section supports resolving the circuit split in favor of adopting a
selective waiver theory by upholding confidentiality agreements be-
tween corporations and the SEC. Public policy, precedent, the pur-
pose behind the attorney-client privilege, and the legislative intent of
the Act and SEC Rule 205 all support such a decision.
A. Reasoning of the Circuits
In considering whether to allow a selective waiver of the attorney-
client privilege via a confidentiality agreement with the government,
the circuits have relied on very similar reasoning. The courts have
based their opinions on the purpose of the attorney-client privilege
and the search for truth, but have reached conflicting conclusions.' 86
The Third and Sixth Circuits found that allowing corporations to se-
lectively waive the attorney-client privilege as to the government hin-
dered the search for truth, while the Eighth Circuit, California federal
district court, and the Delaware state court found that a selective
waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to the government pursuant
to a confidentiality agreement ensured full and frank communications
between the corporate client and attorney.1 87
Many of the cases addressing selective waiver analyze both the at-
torney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. This Comment fo-
cuses primarily on the attorney-client privilege, but as articulated by
Judge Boggs's dissent in In re Columbia/HCA many of the reasons for
supporting selective waiver of the attorney-client privilege apply when
considering selective waiver of the attorney work product doctrine. 88
1. Third and Sixth Circuits' Analyses
The decisions of the Third and Sixth Circuits rest firmly on the
traditional waiver doctrine without regard to the unique relationship
186. See infra notes 190-197 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 189-197 and accompanying text. In re McKesson only upheld the selec-
tive waiver doctrine as to attorney work product. In re McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 99-CV-
20743, 2005 WL 934331, at * 9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005).
188. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
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among a corporate attorney, the corporation and the government. 89
Both circuits articulated that releasing privileged information to any
party is inconsistent with the assertion of the attorney-client privi-
lege.190 Among the reasons courts present for refusing to allow a se-
lective waiver of the attorney-client privilege are the search for truth,
privacy, and fairness.1 91 Without considering the corporate attorney's
role as counselor and advisor of corporate compliance, the courts
found that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege, to encourage
full and frank communication between attorney and client, was not
furthered by adopting a selective waiver rule where the client could
waive the privilege only as to the government.192 Further, the Sixth
Circuit expressed a fairness concern stating that allowing the corpora-
tion to waive the privilege as to the government, but not as to others,
disadvantaged private litigants. 193 Thus, the courts felt that the tradi-
tional waiver rule best protected the attorney-client privilege and en-
sured that information was not selectively disclosed to the government
at the expense of private litigants.
2. The Eighth Circuit, Northern District of California, and
Delaware State Courts' Analyses
Although concluding differently, the Eight Circuit, the Northern
District of California, and the Delaware state court also based their
decisions on the purpose of the attorney-client privilege and policy
referencing the search for truth, fairness, privacy, and government ef-
ficiency.1 94 The courts concluded that the "all-or-nothing" approach
189. See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1420 (3d.
Cir. 1991); In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 302 (6th
Cir. 2002).
190. See Westinghouse Electric Corp., 951 F.2d at 1420; In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 303
(quoting Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214,1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981) "The client cannot
be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents, waiving the privilege for some and resur-
recting the claim of confidentiality as to others .. "); see also In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at
303 (noting that privacy is gone once the client has consented to release of information).
191. See Okrzesik, supra note 96, at 147-56 (discussing justifications for courts refusal to allow
selective waiver).
192. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 951 F.2d at 1418; In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 303
(noting that a disclosure to a governmental agency may further the truth-seeking process, but
should not do so at the expense of private litigants). But see Okrzesik, supra note 96, at 147.
The courts limited the attorney-client privilege for fear that the privilege restrained the search
for truth and that disclosure of information was contrary to the privacy protection afforded by
the privilege. Id.
193. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 302.
194. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that the
company's waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to the SEC did not waive the privilege as to
private litigants.); Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc, No. CIV.A.18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8
(Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 2002), affd, CIV.A. 18554, 2005 WL 583742 (Del. Mar. 8, 2005) (stating that
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to selective waiver hindered the corporate attorney's role as advi-
sor. 195 Rather, these courts found that the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege is furthered by ensuring corporations that information
discussed with attorneys would not be released to the public if dis-
closed to a government agency. 196 Contrary to the Third and Sixth
Circuits, the Eighth Circuit and Delaware state courts noted that the
search for truth is unhindered by the attorney-client privilege because
information may not be revealed whatsoever without the protection of
the privilege and a corresponding confidentiality agreement for infor-
mation released to the government. 197 Moreover, private litigants are
not disadvantaged by upholding confidentiality agreements protecting
attorney-client privileged communication because, except in special
circumstances, no party has access to privileged communications.' 98
Finally, the courts held that government investigations would be more
efficient and effective by upholding selective waiver of the confidenti-
ality agreement. 199
both the shareholders and the capital markets benefit from a selective disclosure rule allowing
information to be disclosed to the SEC and not to private litigants); In re McKesson HBOC, Inc.,
No. 99-CV-20743, 2005 WL934331, at * 9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005) (stating that permitting
disclosure to the work product doctrine).
195. See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8. "When courts amplify the risk of disclosure to in-
clude future private plaintiffs, the scales begin to tip further in favor of corporate non compli-
ance with investigative agencies. A rigid rule leading to such an unwholesome trend seems
unwise." Id see also Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 611. "To hold otherwise may have the effect
of thwarting the developing procedure of corporations to employ independent outside counsel to
investigate and advise them in order to protect stockholders, potential stockholders and custom-
ers." Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 611.
196. See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (stating that encouraging corporation to disclose in-
formation confidentially to the SEC allows the SEC to resolve its investigations expeditiously
and efficiently); see In re McKesson HBOC, 2005 WL934331, at *9 (citing with approval Judge
Boggs's dissent in In re Columbia/HCA noting that the choice between disclosure to the govern-
ment under a confidentiality agreement or otherwise no access supports a selective waiver doc-
trine where the public is benefited); see In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., Billing Practices
Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 314 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting). Judge Boggs specifically states in
his dissent that many of the reasons for supporting selective waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege apply when considering selective waiver of the attorney work product doctrine despite other
courts finding to the contrary. Id.
197. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 307(6th
Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (noting that upholding confidentiality agreements with the gov-
ernment increases the information available and aides in the truth-seeking process).
198. See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622 at *11. "The selective waiver rule encourages cooperation
with law enforcement agencies without any negative cost to society or to private plaintiffs." Id.
199. See id. at *8. "When the SEC more efficiently protects the integrity of the capital mar-
kets, shareholders benefit." Id.; see also In re McKesson HBOC, 2005 WL934331, at * 10 (not-
ing that the government benefited from the disclosure because it could focus its investigation on
the primary wrongdoers and deploy fewer employees to investigate McKesson).
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B. Circuit Split Should Be Resolved in Favor of Selective Waiver
Pursuant to a Confidentiality Agreement
The circuit split should be resolved by following the Eighth Circuit
and Delaware state courts' approaches to selective waiver and confi-
dentiality agreements. The Third and Sixth Circuits' reasoning is
flawed in that both courts: (1) misapply the purpose behind the attor-
ney-client privilege in their interpretation of the traditional waiver
doctrine; (2) rely too heavily on the fairness to private litigants argu-
ment; and (3) fail to consider the changing environment in which cor-
porate attorneys practice and businesses operate. Accordingly, in
light of the established purpose behind the attorney-client privilege
and policy, courts should uphold confidentiality agreements which
waive the attorney-client privilege (or attorney work product doc-
trine) only as to the government in order to effectuate the appropriate
balance between the protection of shareholder's interest and protec-
tion of client confidences under Rule 205 and the Act. 200
1. Selective Waiver through Confidentiality Agreements Furthers
the Purpose of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The Supreme Court articulated that the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege is to "encourage full and frank communication be-
tween attorneys and their clients and thereby to promote broader
public interests in observance of law and administration of justice. ' 20 1
However, the Third and Sixth Circuits have focused primarily on the
"full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients"
portion finding that allowing selective waiver of the attorney-client
privilege is effectively creating a "client-government" exception.20 2
This approach is far too limited. There is no client-government excep-
200. Giovanni P. Prezioso, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks before the A.B.A. Section of Bus.
Law (April 3, 2004) (stating that the debate surrounding Rule 205 has exposed the tensions
between the duty to serve shareholder interests and the duty to protect client confidences; be-
tween federal authority to regulate attorneys appearing and practicing before the SEC and tradi-
tional state regulation of attorneys).
201. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 388 (1980) (holding that communications by
Upjohn employees to counsel are covered by the attorney-client privilege where company's at-
torneys sent questionnaire to and interviewed employees regarding questionable payments of
foreign government officials); see also supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
202. See In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 302. "The attorney-client privilege was never de-
signed to protect conversations between a client and the government... rather, it pertains only to
conversations between the client and his or her attorney." Id.; see also Dorris, supra note 14, at
789. Dorris argues that the limited waiver rule does not concern the privilege between attorney
and client; rather, it implicitly creates a new privilege between corporations and the SEC. Dor-
ris, supra note 14, at 789. Dorris relies on the Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214
(D.C. Cir. 1981), decision where the DC Circuit found a limited waiver rule to be inconsistent
with the assertion of the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 802-803.
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tion to the attorney-client privilege because the client is not communi-
cating with the government, but rather, the client and/or attorney is
releasing attorney-client privileged information to the government
pursuant to a confidentiality agreement. 20 3 This exception to the
waiver rule allows a selective release of information to the govern-
ment while still retaining the privilege as to other parties. 20 4
Further, the Third and Sixth Circuits ignore the loss of information
which endangers the truth-seeking process.20 5 Judge Boggs of the
Sixth Circuit articulated in his dissent in In re Columbia/HCA that
"[w]ithout the [selective waiver] exception, much otherwise disclosed
material would stay completely in the dark, under the absolute cover
of privilege. '20 6 The Third and Sixth Circuits fail to recognize that
without the exception, the corporation is less likely to reveal informa-
tion to the government and thus, would not disclose the information
whatsoever because it is privileged. 20 7
The Sixth Circuit also argued that a selective waiver rule was unfair
to private litigants who would be barred from the information. 20 8
However, this argument is unfounded. Because the communications
sought are privileged, they would never be required to be released.20 9
Thus, the private plaintiff is in no worse position than if no disclosure
had been made.210 Moreover, the underlying facts of the privileged
communication may be available through other sources which are not
privileged such as business documents. 211 Even if the information is
203. See In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 302; see also Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc, No.
CIV.A.18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 2002), affd, CIV.A. 18554, 2005 WL
583742 (Del. Mar. 8, 2005) (stating that a party has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
information when it is released only pursuant to a confidentiality agreement).
204. See In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (discussing a govern-
ment exception to the waiver rule).
205. See id. at 313 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (stating that either the government gets the disclo-
sure made because of the exception or neither the government nor any other party becomes
privy to the privileged material).
206. Id. (Boggs, J., dissenting) (noting also that the exception aids the government in bringing
violations of the law to light).
207. Id. at 309 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 303 (quoting Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
"[t]he client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents, waiving the privilege
for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality as to others."); see also Okrzesik, supra
note 96, at 167 (stating that the Sixth Circuit in In re Columbia/HCA, discussed "other" means
for the government to obtain documents, but other means cannot reach privileged information).
209. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
210. Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. CIV.A.18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *11 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 25, 2002), affd, CIV.A. 18554, 2005 WL 583742 (Del. Mar. 8, 2005).
211. See Hall, supra note 159, at 984 (stating that the attorney-client privilege protects all legal
communications between attorneys and their clients, but does not protect disclosure of the un-
derlying facts of a given situation).
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privileged, private shareholder litigants may be able to gain access to
the information pursuant to the Garner Doctrine.212 In Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, the Fifth Circuit held that where the corporation is in a
suit against its stockholders on charges of acting against shareholder
interests, the stockholders must show "good cause" as to why the at-
torney-client privilege should not be invoked for communications be-
tween the corporation and its attorneys.213 Thus, upon a showing of
good cause by the private shareholder plaintiff, the Garner Doctrine
may allow for the release of attorney-client privileged information. 214
Finally, the private litigant arguably has already benefited from the
release of the information to the government and the remedy of the
unlawful conduct by the corporation. 215
2. Policy Reasons Support Selective Waiver through
Confidentiality Agreements
Perhaps the strongest support for adopting the approach of the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the Delaware state courts is pol-
icy. Federal courts regularly consider public policy when analyzing
rules.216 Here, policy reasons in support of upholding confidentiality
agreements span the spectrum including the drastic change in corpo-
rate law as a result of the Act and SEC Rule 205, promoting the spirit
of disclosure mandated by these rules, economic concerns, and pro-
tecting the attorney-client privilege and the private investor.
212. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1970). Note, however, that not all
circuits have applied the Garner Doctrine consistently. See American Steamship Owners Mu-
tual Protection & Indemnity Assoc. v. Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 191, 201-02
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing cases applying and declining to apply the Garner Doctrine). See
Lefkowitz v. Duquesne Light Co., CIV. A. Nos. 86-1046 & 86-2085, 1998 WL 169273, at *6
(W.D. Pa. 1988) (declining to apply the Garner Doctrine for fear that the doctrine may result in
less open and candid attorney-client communication).
213. Id. See American Steampship, 232 F.R.D. at 201 (noting that while Garner v.
Wolfinbarger was a derivative action, the doctrine has been applied to non-derivative claims).
214. Id. at 1104. Garner factors for showing "good cause" are: (1) number of shares owned by
the shareholder and the percentage of stock they represent; (2) the assertion of a colorable
claim; (3) the necessity of the information and its unavailability from other sources; (4) whether
the stockholder has identified the information sought and is not merely fishing for information;
and (5) whether the communication is advice concerning the litigation itself. Id.
215. See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (stating that the plaintiff who was contesting the
confidentiality of the disclosure had already benefited from the confidential disclosures because
the integrity of the capital markets is preserved).
216. See In re ColumbiaIHCA Healthcare Corp., Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 310 (6th
Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 (1996)); see also FED.
R. EviD. 501.
2006]
340 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
a. Changing Corporate Landscape
Both In re Columbia/HCA and Westinghouse Electric Corp., were
decided before the enactment of the Act in late 2002 and the imple-
mentation of SEC Rule 205, and thus do not consider the regulatory
environment in which corporations operate today.217 These disclosure
rules have weakened the protections of the attorney-client privi-
lege.218 SEC Rule 205 requires that attorneys report up-the-ladder of
the corporation any material violation of securities laws and attorneys
are presumably expected to assist in remedying any wrongdoing. 219
While not required to report violations to the SEC, a corporate attor-
ney's role is to provide corporate clients with sound legal advice which
may include a recommendation to disclose material violations of se-
curities laws to the SEC contemporaneously or prior to an investiga-
tion.220 Further, while Rule 205 only requires "up-the-ladder"
reporting within the corporation and thus does not diminish the attor-
ney-client privilege per se, the nature of the attorney-client privilege is
sacrificed because the lawyer is placed in a position of having to police
the corporation. 221 It is entirely contradictory to the spirit of disclo-
sure advocated by Congress in the Act and the SEC in Rule 205, to
not uphold confidentiality agreements as to the government.222
Simply put, attorneys are caught between a "rock and a hard place."
On one hand, attorneys are bound by the attorney-client privilege,
which protects the conversations between the attorney and the client
217. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
218. See Cohen, supra note 12, at 309 (discussing criticism of the Act by the American Corpo-
rate Counsel Association and the ABA finding that clients, and not attorneys, are ultimately
vested with the power to choose to accept or reject their lawyer's advice); see also id. at 311
(stating that the Act will lead to a complete deterioration of the attorney-client privilege in ten
years).
219. See Semple, supra note 6, at 423. Section 205 of the SEC rule includes "up-the-ladder"
reporting. Id.
220. See Gregory Massing, Note, The Fifth Amendment, the Attorney-Client Privilege, and the
Prosecution of White Collar Crime, 75 VA. L. REV. 1179, 1198 (1989) (noting that the attorney-
client privilege may create a "zone of silence" surrounding corporate affairs, but noting that the
attorney-client privilege is necessary for attorneys to give sound legal advice).
221. 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 9.8 (5th ed. 2006).
222. See Semple, supra note 6, at 428 (quoting Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No.
CIV.A.18553, 2002 WL 31657622 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 2002), affd, CIV.A. 18554, 2005 WL 583742
(Del. Mar. 8, 2005), "[t]he Delaware Court of Chancery- no stranger to business dis-
putes-adopted a selective waiver rule for disclosures made to law enforcement agencies pursu-
ant to a confidentiality agreement because such a rule 'encourages cooperation with law
enforcement agencies without any negative cost to society or to private plaintiffs .... '); see also
Senate Consideration of Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of
2002, 107th Cong. S6524, S6524 (2002) (explaining that the purpose of the Act was "to improve
quality and transparency in financial reporting and independent audits... to increase corporate
responsibility and the usefulness of corporate financial disclosure...").
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and is the foundation of good legal representation.2 23 Lawyers are
most effective when clients completely confide in their attorneys, and
thus, the search for truth must sometimes yield to the protections of
the attorney-client privilege.22 4
On the other hand, corporate attorneys practicing in any way before
the SEC are also subject to SEC Rule 205 and the Act which promote
disclosure of information.22 5 As evidenced by the SEC's processes for
investigating corporations, the government considers "cooperation" in
determining whether to bring charges against a corporation.2 26 While
not required, it is often necessary for the corporation to release attor-
ney-client privileged information in order to "cooperate" with the in-
vestigation.2 27 Moreover, it is also often in the best interest of the
corporation to release the information on a selective basis to the gov-
ernment to obtain leniency or to remedy any wrongdoing.228 How-
ever, if the corporation is not able to rely on the confidentiality
agreement promised by the government, the corporation risks the re-
lease of the privileged information to the public. Further, with this
known risk, the corporation may only provide the attorney with "se-
lective information" thus hindering the attorney's advice, counsel, or
strategy.
223. Zeineddine, supra note 6, at 148 (noting that the ABA considers the attorney-client rela-
tionship and the legal advice rendered to the client as indispensable elements to the attorney's
role as a counselor).
224. See id. (noting that the ABA considers the attorney-client relationship and the legal ad-
vice rendered to the client as indispensable elements to the attorney's role as a counselor); see
also Okrzesik, supra note 96, at 148. "The consensus, however, is that the need for truth-finding
is offset by the more imperative need to preserve the client's sense of confidentiality with her
attorney. Specifically, the client must feel free to divulge all information so that the attorney can
filter the important from the trivial." Id.
225. Litt, supra note 2, at C-3 (discussing Section 307 of the Act's mandate on the SEC to
create a mandatory requirement for attorneys practicing before the SEC in response to the ero-
sion of corporate integrity and ethics).
226. Hochberg, supra note 13, at L-13-L-14. "Waiver is not required as a measure of cooper-
ation." Id. See also HAZEN, supra note 221, at § 9.8 (stating that "cooperation in criminal, SEC
and other regulatory investigations will reflect positively in the settlement process and in select-
ing appropriate sanctions. It is the position of the Department of Justice and SEC that waiver of
the attorney-client privilege in the course of the investigation will be a positive factor in selecting
sanctions."). But see Hochberg, supra note 13, at L-13 (stating that "[in evaluating cooperation,
the Principles [of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations] tell prosecutors that they can
consider whether the corporation turned over any internal investigation it may have conducted,
and waived privileges." (emphasis added)).
227. Hochberg, supra note 13, at L-13. "Sometimes, in order to fully cooperate and disclose
all the facts, a corporation will have to make some waiver because it has gathered the facts
through privileged interviews and the protected work product of counsel." Id.
228. Hochberg, supra note 13, at L-13-14 (noting that a wide range of factors are considered
when charging a corporation, cooperation being one of them).
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With the protection of the confidentiality agreement, the attorney
and the corporation benefit. The corporation is more likely to fully
disclose information to the attorney, which better equips the attorney
to represent the client.229 The corporation and attorney are comply-
ing with SEC Rule 205 and the Act's spirit of disclosure 230 and are
thus more likely to be proactive in preventing and remedying poten-
tial corporate wrongdoing. 231
b. Economic Benefits
By upholding confidentiality agreements, corporations and the pub-
lic benefit economically. Corporations benefit in two ways. First, by
upholding confidentiality agreements, corporations do not risk expo-
sure to massive liability by cooperating with a government investiga-
tion or complying with disclosure requirements which might
ultimately lead to a government investigation. 232 Second, by comply-
ing with government investigation cooperation requirements, the cor-
poration may receive a lessened monetary punishment for any
violations. The government specifically considers cooperation with in-
vestigation and particularly, disclosure of information, in determining
whether to prosecute or punish a corporation.233 Accordingly, by fully
cooperating with any government investigation, the corporation may
reduce its risk to financial loss.
The public also benefits economically from the use of confidential-
ity agreements because it helps to preserve the integrity of the capital
229. See Zeineddine, supra note 6, at 153 (stating that considering the complexity and amount
of regulatory legislation challenging the modern corporate governance, corporations must fre-
quently go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law).
230. See Lucci, supra note 7, at 366 (noting that a goal of the Act was to prevent lawyers from
ignoring or assisting in corporate wrongdoing). See also HAZEN, supra note 221, at §9.8 (noting
that an attorney's appearance before an administrative agency reflects two concerns: (1) the
proper role of the attorney in light of their interest in representing their clients properly; and (2)
the public interest in documents filed with the SEC because the public relies on that information
in making financial decisions). Id.
231. See Zeineddine, supra note 6, at 153. Zeineddine is discussing the noisy withdrawal pro-
posal to SEC Rule 205; however, her argument is persuasive as to confidentiality agreements as
well. "[Noisy withdrawal] would remove an incentive for clients involved in misconduct to re-
veal corporate secrets to their attorneys, leaving those attorneys in the dark." Zeineddine, supra
note 6, at 153. "Conversely, if attorneys were not required to blow the whistle to a third party,
clients would be encouraged to completely confide in their attorneys and seek frank legal advice
without fear of exposure." Id.
232. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 311 (6th
Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (stating that relatively narrow cooperation with the government
in the form of a disclosure of privileged information can expose an individual or firm to massive
liability and reveal privileged document far greater than the disclosure itself).
233. See supra notes 114-120 and accompanying text.
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markets at a lower cost to society.234 The SEC is the "agency princi-
pally responsible for the administration and enforcement of federal
securities laws, which are designed to protect investors and the integ-
rity of the capital markets. ' 235 Government investigations are more
likely to be of public interest than are suits by private plaintiffs.236
Thus, because privileged information may not be released to private
plaintiffs whatsoever, the use of confidentiality agreements allows the
government to bring suits with information only available pursuant to
the confidentiality agreement and saves the public from the economic
loss resulting from corporate wrongdoing. 237 Accordingly, sharehold-
ers benefit when the SEC more efficiently protects the integrity of the
capital markets. 238
c. Public Policy
From a public policy perspective, upholding confidentiality agree-
ments best protects the public investor from corporate fraud while still
preserving the attorney-client privilege. The disclosure requirements
the SEC instituted, the Act introduced, and the ABA Model Rules
suggested have forced corporate attorneys to shift focus from the cli-
ent to the public, which is an aberration of the attorney-client privi-
lege. 239 At the same time, the SEC has a pervasive interest in
maintaining confidence in capital markets as demonstrated by Con-
gress's enactment of the Act and even attorney support of the Act. 240
Accordingly, allowing corporations to release privileged information
to the government, particularly the SEC, pursuant to a confidentiality
agreement strikes the most effective balance between the two legiti-
mate concerns of preserving the attorney-client privilege and protect-
ing the investing public. 241 The corporation is furthering the spirit of
disclosure, but not sacrificing their privilege as to the entire litigating
world.
234. Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. CIV.A.18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 25, 2002), affd, CIV.A. 18554, 2005 WL 583742 (Del. Mar. 8, 2005). See Hall, supra note
159, at 994 (noting that selective waiver encourages increased cooperation with the governments
and decreases cost to the government, the disclosing party and the court system).
235. Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (quoting Brief of the United States SEC as Amicus
Curiae).
236. See In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting). Government investiga-
tions are more likely to be in the public interest. Id.
237. Id.
238. Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8.
239. Zeineddine, supra note 6, at 152-53.
240. Id. at 152.
241. Id. at 153.
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Private litigants are not disadvantaged by allowing privileged infor-
mation to be disclosed only to government agencies. 242 The Supreme
Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States, supported this idea by stating
that because, presumably, the client would not reveal the confidential
information without the privilege, denying third parties access to the
confidential information puts third parties in no worse a position that
if the privileged communication had never taken place. And because
the privilege only protects the disclosure of privileged communica-
tions, it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those
who communicate with the attorney.243 Private litigants are not
barred from bringing suits even where the government conducts an
investigation. Further, private litigants may seek the underlying facts
of the privileged communication from other non-privileged sources. 244
In addition to economic savings, the SEC investigation benefits the
public from a policy perspective. Confidentiality agreements with the
SEC increase the information available in government investigations
and further the truth-seeking process. 245 With the ever-increasing ve-
racity of regulations placed on corporations, a selective waiver of the
attorney-client privilege as to the government promotes heightened
observance of law and regulations.246 Corporations should be en-
couraged to increase conversations with counsel, rather than be dis-
couraged by the threat of the release of privileged communications.
Accordingly, a selective waiver rule increases corporate compliance
with regulations designed to protect the investing public because the
disclosing party is more likely to understand and comply with applica-
ble laws and regulations. 247 Investors are naturally benefited by an
increased confidence in corporate governance and a corresponding
confidence in the capital market.
IV. IMPAcT
This section considers the effects of not resolving the circuit split in
favor of upholding confidentiality agreements and the problems asso-
ciated with continuing the status quo. Additionally, this section sug-
gests a legislative solution to the circuit split and the likely impact of
such legislation.
242. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
243. Upjohn Co. v United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).
244. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 311(Boggs, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 307.
246. See Hall, supra note 159, at 996 (stating that a primary reason that a corporation may
cooperate with an investigation is to comply with the law as soon as possible).
247. Id. at 996.
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A. Effects of Not Upholding Confidentiality Agreements
If confidentiality agreements are not upheld, corporations will be
exposed to massive liability, the purpose of recent legislation regard-
ing corporate disclosure will be sabotaged, the attorney-client privi-
lege will be further diminished, and corporate clients will be less likely
to cooperate with a government investigation.
As the dissent in In re Columbia/HCA stated, "relatively narrow
cooperation with the government in the form of a disclosure of privi-
leged information can expose . . .a firm to massive liability. ' 248 If
confidentiality agreements are not honored, privileged client informa-
tion would be available to any private litigant despite the SEC's prom-
ise that the attorney-client privilege would be retained as to other
parties. In exchange for cooperating with the SEC, the corporation
would face a multitude of private lawsuits fueled with privileged infor-
mation.249 In essence, the corporation would be doubly punished and
the private investor doubly benefited. The corporation would face the
SEC's punishment, as well as any damages as a result of shareholder
suits. However, the shareholder would benefit both from the SEC in-
vestigation's protection of the economy as a whole, and from a private
cause of action for damages supported by privileged information gath-
ered from the SEC's investigation.
Additionally, by not upholding confidentiality agreements, courts
would discourage the disclosure purpose behind the Act. Corpora-
tions would be less likely to cooperate with the SEC and less likely to
consult with attorneys for fear of massive litigation. Decreased coop-
eration with the SEC increases costs to shareholders, the government
and the economy.250 The SEC has publicly supported upholding con-
fidentiality agreements by suggesting a provision to SEC Rule 205
which would provide that confidentiality agreements with the SEC
were not a waiver of privilege. The SEC's position was that such a
rule would encourage cooperative issuers and attorneys to produce
internal reports under a confidentiality agreement; thus expediting the
SEC investigation.251 However, despite this initial support, the SEC's
248. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 311 (6th Cir.
2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
249. See supra notes 212-213 and accompanying text.
250. See Hall, supra note 159, at 996-97 (discussing the reduced costs of investigations for the
government). These costs are passed on to the tax payer and likely to the shareholder as well
because of the increased attorney's fees to the corporation.
251. See Semple, supra note 6, at 427-28 (discussing proposed SEC Rule 205.3(e)(3) which
stated that an issuer would not waive any applicable privileges by sharing confidential informa-
tion with the SEC).
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proposed rule was withdrawn.2 52 Without a clear legislative position,
courts are in disarray on how to handle the issue.253
B. Effects of Continuing the Status Quo
If the status quo is maintained and courts continue to disagree on
the applicability of confidentiality agreements, corporations and cor-
porate attorneys will be confused and forum shopping will be en-
couraged. Further, the same concerns associated with not upholding
selective waivers pursuant to a confidentiality agreement will also be
relevant if the status quo continues.254
Many corporations subject to SEC regulation are international or-
ganizations with jurisdiction in many courts. If no action is taken, the
circuit split will extend to other circuits which have not taken a posi-
tion on confidentiality agreements and the inconsistencies will be per-
petuated. This will only hinder the purposes behind the attorney-
client privilege and SEC Rule 205. "The attorney-client privilege ex-
ists to enable a person to consult freely and openly with an attorney
without any fear of compelled disclosure of the information communi-
cated. '12 55 Certainly, today's corporations do stand in fear that disclo-
sures to counsel will be reported, at minimum, within the
corporation.2 56 Upholding confidentiality agreements where the cor-
poration becomes the subject of an SEC investigation, helps belie
some of those fears, at least as to external parties.257 However, courts
infuse fear and uncertainty into the lawyer-client relationship by dif-
fering on the applicability of selective waiver of the attorney-client
privilege pursuant to a confidentiality agreement. Uncertainty in the
relationship between corporate client and attorney will not "foster full
and frank communications," but rather jeopardize this sacred founda-
tion of the attorney-client relationship.2 58
Further, the status quo will encourage both corporate defendants
and private litigants to engage in forum shopping. On the one hand,
plaintiffs will seek to file private causes of action in jurisdictions de-
252. Id. at 429.
253. See id. at 428 (noting that even the SEC has admitted that federal case law on selective or
limited waiver is in hopeless confusion).
254. See supra notes 248-253 and accompanying text.
255. People v. Adam, 51 Ill.2d 46, 48 (1972).
256. See supra notes 28-70 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 200-231 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 95-113 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose behind the attor-
ney-client privilege); see also supra notes 201-215 and accompanying text (discussing how the
truth-seeking process would be hindered if clients do not feel comfortable disclosing information
to their attorneys).
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clining to uphold confidentiality agreements in hopes of obtaining in-
formation released to the SEC during the investigation. On the other
hand, defendant corporations will avidly seek to remove the private
litigation to jurisdictions favorable to confidentiality agreements.
While forum shopping is not necessarily reprehensible, such a policy
may prolong litigation and may favor some private litigants.2 59 Fur-
ther, forum shopping does not encourage the truth-seeking process
behind the attorney-client privilege, does not further the spirit of dis-
closure behind the Act and SEC Rule 205, and does not better protect
the public from corporate wrongdoing.
C. Solutions to Resolve the Circuit Split
In order to clarify the SEC's support of confidentiality agreements
and assist courts in solving the circuit split regarding confidentiality
agreements, Congress should adopt legislation specifically upholding
selective waivers as to the government. Such legislation must provide
clear provisions which allow the party to cooperate with the govern-
ment without the practical administrative complications anticipated by
the Sixth Circuit in In re Columbia/HCA.2 60 In doing so, the legal
profession will simultaneously preserve its core values and adjust to
current policy goals articulated in the Act.261
Legislation adopted by Congress should specifically articulate that
the selective waiver rule applies only to disclosures made in coopera-
tion with a government investigation. While under the Act and SEC
Rule 205, the SEC is the obvious government agency likely to be a
party to the agreement, logistically the waiver would be most effective
as to the government as a whole. Limiting the disclosure only to the
SEC would be problematic when, for example, the SEC and DOJ are
both conducting investigations of a corporation. The government can
259. See AXA Corporate Solutions v. Underwriters Reinsurance Group, 347 F.3d 272 (7th.
Cir. 2003). The court in discussing forum shopping stated, "We are not so naive as to believe
that lawyers will not try to exploit whatever differences they may perceive among the federal
circuits at any given time. Nevertheless, those differences are ultimately subject to reconciliation
by the Supreme Court, if they are not cured by the transfer devices that exist or through the rule-
making process." Id. at 277. The court was not addressing the selective waiver rule, but the
court's statement is analogous to selective waiver and confidentiality agreements.
260. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 312 (6th Cir.
2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority suggests that enforcing a selective waiver
rule would be cumbersome and expensive).
261. Semple, supra note 6, at 434.
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be distinguished from private parties because the government func-
tions both to interpret and enforce the laws 262
The legislation should specify that the disclosures made to the gov-
ernment preserve the attorney-client privilege and work product doc-
trine as to third parties even if the government agency brings suit.
Some courts have distinguished between releasing communications to
a non-adversarial party and an adversarial party finding that disclo-
sures to non-adversarial parties retain the privilege. 263 If legislation
distinguished between investigations and suits, the effect of the waiver
would be sharply diminished. Corporations would be fearful to re-
lease privileged communications because of the uncertainty of
whether the investigation will lead to a later suit.
Further, the legislation should require that a disclosing party enter
into a signed confidentiality agreement in order for communications
to be protected. 264 The confidentiality agreement is not a per se selec-
tive waiver, but should be a prerequisite to finding selective waiver as
to the government. The confidentiality agreement cannot "manufac-
ture a privilege," but rather, it is important to record the intent of the
parties to preserve the agreement.265 Accordingly, an interpreting
court will clearly understand the parties' intentions and effective date
which will eliminate the fear that disclosing parties should not "have
their cake and eat it too. '266 This legislative solution effectively cre-
ates a compromise between the corporation and corporate attorney,
who are placed in a particularly tenuous position in light of the Act
and SEC Rule 205.
A legislative solution is preferable to a judicial ruling upholding se-
lective waiver pursuant to confidentiality agreements because it would
better articulate the purposes behind the Act and allow for stream-
lined implementation. While the legislative process is often long and
arduous, the Act was implemented rather quickly as was the SEC's
262. Hall, supra note 159, at 1003. See also Okrzesik, supra note 96, at 168. Further, the
government can be distinguished because private parties will personally benefit from the results
of the lawsuit. Id.
263. See Okrzesik, supra note 96, at 133-34 (discussing two scenarios where the Westinghouse
court might have reached a different conclusion: when the disclosure is inadvertent or made to a
non-adversary, and when there is conscious disregard for the confidentiality of the material).
264. See Hall, supra note 159, at 1004 (stating that a disclosing party should be required to
sign a confidentiality agreement).
265. Okrzesik, supra note 96, at 169.
266. See Hall, supra note 159, at 1004 (noting that the confidentiality agreement should pro-
tect only the communications disclosed after the agreement so that it alleviates some of the fear
that disclosing parties may simply disclose without agreeing to terms of a confidentiality
agreement).
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response manifested in Rule 205.267 Thus, perhaps the legislative en-
ergy behind the goal of corporate disclosure would expedite this legis-
lation. In addition, a legislative solution would offer the SEC268 the
opportunity to actively demonstrate its support of confidentiality
agreements. Finally, unlike a judicial decision, a legislative solution
would outline concrete criteria for confidentiality agreements so as to
limit further litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the recent implementation of legislation governing attor-
ney-conduct and consequently diminishing the protections of the at-
torney-client privilege, Congress would greatly enhance confidence in
the capital markets by creating legislation to require courts to uphold
confidentiality agreements as to the government. Such a move would
also salvage some respect for the confidentiality of the attorney-client
relationship and promote economic and public policy which in turn,
protects the capital markets and individual investors from corporate
fraud. Further, the circuit split would be resolved, uniformity would
prevail in federal courts, and corporate attorneys would be better able
to assist their clients in compliance with the vast regulatory laws gov-
erning corporations. Alternatively, because the legislative process
may be lengthy, the Supreme Court could adopt the Eighth Circuit,
Northern District of California and Delaware state court approach to
selective waiver via confidentiality agreements. Regardless of the
method, corporations and the public would be benefited significantly
by adoption of a selective waiver rule.
267. John Paul Lucci, Enron - The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the International
Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxtey, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 215 (2003) (stating that "[t]he Act was intro-
duced into Congress in early July 2002 and was signed into law by President Bush by the end of
the month."); Matthew Eslick, Note, Tensions Among Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(D)(2), and State Disclosure of Confidential Client Information, 53 DRAKE
L. REv. 133, 137 (2004) (stating that SEC Rule 205 was first introduced in November 2002, but
was not implemented in its current form until February 2003).
268. In addition to the SEC, support from the DOJ would be important.

